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Idiosyncrasies of the 2010
Affordable Care Act from a
Comparative Perspective
Lea Stephan
1 The Affordable Care Act passed by the US Congress in 2010 has been criticized for many
of its shortcomings. However, a policy choice does not emerge in a sterile environment;
it  originates in a particular context and is deeply influenced by society and culture
(Goodin 289), which explains why it is never the objectively best solution that is chosen,
but  a  solution  that  works  in  a  given  context.  Comparative  political  science  is  an
efficient way of assessing particularities due to a specific context (Van Woodward 9,
17). By examining the differences and similarities between two countries on a given
issue, the contextual particularities that shaped each policy can emerge. When looking
at  issues that  seem to converge across Western countries,  such as  cost-control  and
insurance systems, such a comparison highlights the divergence. Similar conditions are
often expected to lead to similar policy choices, but choices are deeply shaped by social,
cultural, and political values (Blank and Burau 265, 280). 
2 In a comparative approach of social policies, the distinctiveness of the American system
has  often  been  highlighted.  For  example,  among  the  health  systems  of  the  post-
industrial world, the US stands out because of its heavy reliance on the private market
to  address  health  care  needs  (Gerliner  and  Burkhardt;  Evans  135-6,  141).1 These
specificities have often been explained in terms of typically American values: individual
freedom,  personal  responsibility,  and  small  government  (Gilens  1).  More  recently,
however,  it  has  increasingly  been  argued  that  American  social  policies  are  deeply
racialized and that  systemic  racism has  strongly  contributed to  the  shaping of  the
American welfare state  (Edsall).  The comparative approach obviously  has  its  limits.
Sociologist  and  political  scientist  Theda  Skocpol,  for  example,  discards  a  purely
comparative  analysis  of  US  social  policies.  According  to  her,  the  comparative
perspective alone, without an in-depth analysis of the historical development of social
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policies in the US, does not allow for a satisfying explanation of this racialization of
social policies that occurred in the US (Skocpol 12).
3 Nonetheless, comparisons with other countries are useful to put forward the specificity
of the racial context of the United States in showing how the issue evolved in countries
where discourse is not deeply stained by racial conflict. Therefore, comparisons will be
made with health care policies in Europe, from their origins in Germany in 1883 to
today and in a range of countries, with a focus on Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France.  Comparisons  with  Canada  will  be  made  as  well,  notably  because  of  its
geographical  proximity  and  frequent  use  as  example  of  a  health  care  system  that
‘works’. Regrettably, systematic comparisons are not possible, so comparisons will be
made in a way as to most effectively highlight salient differences.
4 We will first give a brief overview of the development of health policies in the US, then
we will expose the major flaws of Medicare-Medicaid. Finally, we will examine Obama’s
health care reform, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to reveal the peculiar aspects directly
influenced by the historical and racialized development of American social policies.
 
A Brief Historical Overview of Health Policy
Development
5 It is commonly assumed that social policies were only developed in the US during the
1930s with President Roosevelt’s  New Deal  programs.  However,  there is  a  far  older
American Welfare  State.  Early  American social  policy  developed at  local,  state,  and
federal levels. Those programs involved benefits for Civil War veterans, an inclusive
primary  and secondary  school  system,  and some benefits  for  widows and orphans,
which were further developed in 1910. The proportions should not be overlooked: early
social policies mostly benefited elderly white men in the North (Skocpol 12; Fording
and Schram 54-7).
6 Regarding health insurance at the turn of the 20th century, the US was not initially
lagging behind other industrialized countries. Germany had passed pioneering health
legislation in 1883, and both the US and the UK were contemplating more social policies
in the 1910s. In Washington the idea of national health insurance made some headway
but failed by 1920 (Howard 60).
7 The  European  model  clearly  inspired  the  US  in  envisaging  comprehensive  social
policies, but all those European states had a strong government to take action in those
matters.  In  the  United  States,  however,  the  Progressive  Era  of  the  1910s  must  be
understood  in  relation  to  its  “19th  century  patronage  democracy”:  local  systems
disbursed social  benefits  to  expand and maintain  their  constituencies,  hence  social
benefits were associated with corruption, especially through veterans’ pensions. The
system covered many more people than there were actual veterans: about 1/3 of the
native-born men in the North received a pension. There was a willingness to rework
this  system into  universal  coverage  for  old  age  and  disability  but  attempts  by  the
Wilson  administration  to  expand  social  policies  were  hampered  by  the  association
between social benefits and political corruption (Skocpol 141-4).
8 Shortly  after  the  1912  elections,  in  which  Theodore  Roosevelt  ran  on  a  platform
including  health  insurance,  health  care  legislation  was  promoted  by  a  group  of
academics and the American Association for Labor Legislation. Although their proposal
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was rather conservative and would only have covered workers (domestic and casual
workers excluded),2 their proposal was strongly opposed by labor unions because of
their strong distrust of government, but even more because unions provided this type
of benefits for their members and feared the competition (Patel and Rushefsky 39).
Insurers opposed the proposal as well because they viewed it as a government assault
on  private  enterprise.  After  World  War I,  opposition  to  health  legislation  grew
stronger, because it had its origins in the much-hated German nation (Starr 30-5).
9 Although  there  were  advocates  of  universal  health  coverage  prior  to  World  War I,
strong opposition developed as well. Because of the medical progress made during the
1920s, opposition to compulsory insurance emerged. Opponents such as the American
Medical Association feared that the government would set limits and issue regulations
that would hamper their opportunity of making greater profits from health services,
especially from middle-class patients who were attracted by medical progress. At the
same time, France debated the expansion of social protection. Small business notably
opposed those ideas because they feared cost increases (Elbaum 30).
10 During the New Deal, President Roosevelt showed great interest in establishing health
insurance but “political realities”, namely opposition from Republicans and Southern
Democrats with the support of lobbies like the American Medical Association (AMA),
prevented it (Katz 258).
11 During the same period, and partly fuelled by Roosevelt’s New Deal, Canada attempted
to introduce comprehensive, national health care, but the government’s proposal was
defeated (Boychuck 34-5, 37-8).
12 Truman introduced health care reform twice, in 1945 and 1949, and was defeated both
times.  Although the  New Deal  had been under  attack  from the  beginning,  Truman
remained openly very supportive of the Welfare State principle and the New Deal. Just
like  Roosevelt’s  plan,  Truman’s  attempts  to  establish  national  health  care  were
attacked as socialism (Morone and Blumenthal). This seems particularly ironic from a
comparative perspective, since one of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s motives
in enacting health care was to weaken the appeal of  German socialists  (Blackbourn
346).3 Similar motives were at work in France, but they only found hesitant expression
in the 1880s and 1890s (Elbaum 30).4 The Truman health program planned for national
health coverage run and funded by government (Truman 2015). But out of respect for
American love of freedom, the program would have been optional. Political scientist
Gerard  Boychuck  argues  that  Truman’s  health  reforms  were  opposed  and  defeated
because  they  were  openly  linked  to  the  administration’s  desegregation  efforts
(Boychuck 41).
13 While Truman’s health care bills were defeated in the US, France started developing a
comprehensive  health  care  system  in  1945  (Valtriani  11).  Contracting  health  care
insurance became mandatory, but the system was mixed: only part of the coverage is
run by government (Elbaum 7).5 
14 As mentioned earlier, opposition rhetoric equating universal and national health care
with socialism was among the forces preventing the creation of legislation in the US.
Hence,  as early as the 1950s,  health care advocates started shifting their discourse,
focusing more on health care for the elderly because it had greater political appeal
(Katz-Olson 22). In comparison, in the UK, the National Health Service was created in
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1948 as  a  state-administered system of  universal  coverage,  funded through general
revenue and free at point of service (Powell).
15 The accusations of “socialized medicine” are still used in conservative rhetoric today,
but are rooted in the periods opposing the Soviet regime and Nazi Germany. According
to sociologist and political scientist Paul Starr, this opposition is a unique feature of
American thinking: “Only in the United States is public responsibility for health-care
costs equated with a loss of freedom.” (Starr 9-10) However, according to Boychuck, the
“socialist”  rhetoric  can  also  be  read  in  a  more  racialized  manner,  especially  since
Truman’s  health  care  efforts  were  closely  linked  with  his  civil  rights  agenda.  The
opposition had remained the same since the Roosevelt attempt. Support, however, was
shown by the National  Association for the Advancement of  Colored People and the
black  National  Medical  Association.  According  to  Boychuck,  the  language  used  to
oppose  civil  rights  matched  the  language  used  to  oppose  health  care.  The  phrase
“socialized medicine” especially pointed to a threat to segregation, the most potent
item being the issue of doctor choice, in both directions, patient-doctor and doctor-
patient. The accusation of socialism can be considered the “easiest and most common
approach to opposing any progressive social legislation” (Boychuck 44, 47, 50).
16 The next attempt at achieving major social reform came in the 1960s with the election
of John F. Kennedy. A new window of opportunity for reform opened, as it had for FDR.6
Kennedy  faced  the  choice  of  moving  toward  the  center  and  diminishing  possible
resistance from conservatives and big business, or to make a bolder move on the left.
Even  more  so  than  FDR  had  done,  Kennedy  chose  to  show  himself  “extremely
conciliatory  with  the  economy.”  (Noble  90)  Kennedy  chose  a  more  conservative
approach, dropping the reform of the tax code and abandoning plans to increase social
spending by 1962,  and opting for  tax cuts  to  stimulate  the economy.  The Kennedy
administration  adopted  the  domestic  policy  agenda  already  established  by
Congressional Democrats, among which figured health care for the aged and the poor.
But  when conservatives  blocked the  proposals,  Kennedy,  who was  “uninterested in
domestic policy and put off by the need to court congressional leaders in order to pass
domestic legislation,” simply focused his attention on other issues (Noble 91).
17 Finally, it was president Lyndon B. Johnson’s commitment to social issues, his savviness
in dealing with Congress, and his ability to use political momentum that allowed him to
push for  health care  legislation.  It  must  be  noted that  Johnson did more than just
enacting  Kennedy’s  projects:  he  redefined  the  proposals  and  pushed  for  more
ambitious legislation (Jansson 243; Feagin 73; Noble 93). 
18 Johnson faced mixed conditions for enacting legislation. The economy was booming,
making it difficult for conservatives to mobilize business opposition; in fact, business
was rather supportive of new social  policies (Noble 82-3).  The situation was similar
when Bismarck first enacted social policies in Germany, as business had been a driving
force,  recognizing  their  advantage  in  a  healthier  and  more  secure  workforce
(Blackbourn 346).7 But Southern Democrats, Unions, and Federalism took their toll on
the new health care system.
19 The New Deal had set the precedent for a “two-track system” through Social Security
and public assistance targeting only the elderly and the very poor (Noble 79). This way
of proceeding precluded any universalist  approach,  and made it  subsequently more
difficult to argue for universal programs.8 It should come as no surprise that the 1965
health  care  legislation,  envisaged  as  a  temporary  step  toward  universal  coverage,
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should  have  matched  the  system  set  by  the  New  Deal:  Medicaid  for  the  poor  and
Medicare  for  the  elderly.  Although  the  Medicare  proposal  received  broad  public
support,  the Medicaid part  of  the legislation was designed secretly by Johnson and
Wilbur  Mills,  then  Chairman  of  the  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  (the  main
committee with jurisdiction over health issues). The final proposal came as a surprise
to Congress and Johnson’s role in it has long been downplayed, although, according to
Mills,  Johnson’s  involvement  was  crucial  in  achieving  the  legislation  (Morone  and
Blumenthal 164-5, 166, 194). Medicare was especially opposed by the American Medical
Association and the insurance industry (Noble 88). Although they had lost power in
Congress, Southern Democrats were still fierce opponents of any universalist approach
and any improvement of social policies because they feared that their system of racial
segregation could be threatened, but they feared especially that any improvement of
the living conditions of  poor blacks would make it  more difficult  to maintain their
exploitation system and very low wages (Soss et al. 57; Noble 89).
20 Federalism is yet another American feature that shaped the health system. The most
striking  comparison  can  be  made  with  Germany,  since  the  two  countries  have  a
similarly federal structure. Bismarck chose to create a centralized health care system
(Blackbourn 347). However, this must be qualified. Although it is a centralized system,
the government only issues guidelines to be implemented by private, state-supervised
insurance  companies  (Gerlinger  and  Burkhardt).9 The  development  in  the  US  was
slightly different. In the American system, administration of social and public health
care programs is divided between federal and state governments. This depends on the
programs, and some programs are shared between the federal and state levels.  The
administration of health programs will be detailed later, but this sharing of programs
gives  states  greater  freedom  in  administering  certain  programs.  Usually,  the more
conservative states have weaker social programs.
21 One of the most American features in the battle for social policies is the role played by
unions. In Europe, unions and working class alliances were among the driving forces
for the expansion of social policies. In the United States, on the contrary, unions were
initially among the forces hampering the expansion of the Welfare State. The situation
was  complex  because  unions  supported liberal  political  coalitions,  but  only  for
propositions  that  were  feasible  in  the  short  term  and  of  immediate  interest  to
organized workers. They often opposed greater expansions of social policies, because
the  working class  and the  unions  were  greatly  weakened by  racial  divisions.  Their
refusal to integrate minorities prevented them from developing their base and also
made them more reluctant  to  support  social  policies  that  would have benefited all
workers,  including blacks.  Moreover, they felt that their privileges were threatened
through social  policies,  and were particularly  wary of  work-training programs that
would increase competition (Noble 85-8; Feagin 51).10 In short, racial divisions among
the  American working  class  prevented them from supporting  meaningful  universal
social  reform,  ultimately  leading  to  narrowly-tailored  programs,  especially  for  the
health care of the poor.
22 A growing body of scholars has been arguing that divisions among liberal Democrats on
these issues have been deepened by conservative Republicans by racializing the social
policy issue. Political scientists Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines argue that racial
issues, especially race-specific policies, are more divisive on the left than on the right.
Conservative Republicans do not need any racist motivation to oppose social policies;
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they oppose any government intervention out of ideological principle. Democrats, on
the contrary, can effectively be divided using racialized rhetoric.  Initial support for
social  policies  can  be  undermined  by  showing  that  it  benefits  minorities  and  thus
opposition can be fostered among more racially conservative Democrats (Sniderman
and Carmines 44-6, 78) or Democrats elected in more conservative districts or who have
white  working  class  constituencies.  Since  the  1970s,  conservative  Republicans
constructed this racialized rhetoric as follows: the Democratic Party is portrayed as
catering exclusively to minority interests, ignoring claims of the white working and
middle class. In this view, social programs are presented as taxing hard-working whites
to finance government outlays for underserving minorities who lack any work ethic
and live immoral and lazy lives.11
23 At the same time as the US enacted Medicaid-Medicare, Canada managed to introduce
in 1966 comprehensive  national  health  care,  supplanting the  previous  province-by-
province  system.  Canada’s  national  health  care  efforts  had  also  been hampered  by
issues of federalism. However, the creation of the Canadian Medicare (which has the
same name as in the United States, but which refers to health care for everyone in the
Canadian  system)  was  questioned  not  because  of  underlying  racial  concerns  but
because of a discussion on the scope of the prerogatives of the federal government.
Moreover,  according  to  Boychuck’s  analysis,  opposition  by  the  French-speaking
minority  of  Quebec  hampered national  health  care.  However,  the  conservative
government  elected  in  1957  pushed  for  federal-provincial  reconciliation  and  saw
“national health care as a powerful tool for territorial integration.” ( Boychuck 118-9,
124, 125)12
24 In the US,  Johnson managed to  create  a  first  public  health care system in 1965 by
adding title XX in the amendments to the Social Security Act.  Medicare, the health
program for the elderly, is based on an insurance concept to avoid any association with
“socialism.” It is financed through employer and employee payroll taxes. Despite the
fact that it is partly funded by general revenues and is not exclusively contributory,
people associate Medicare with an earned right (Katz-Olson 214). Only Medicare Part A
covering hospital and limited nursing home care is funded by payroll taxes. Part B is
funded by general revenues and beneficiary copayments and covers physician fees and
other services.  Part B was made optional  under pressure from Republicans and the
AMA.  They  also  obtained  the  dropping  of  any  cost-control  measure,  which  led  to
inflating health costs (Starr 46, 48). According to political scientist James Morone and
health care expert David Blumenthal, the issue of segregation shortly jeopardized the
implementation of Medicare. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids discrimination
of any kind for programs that receive federal  assistance.  This  meant that  hospitals
receiving Medicare payments could not segregate. Towards the end of 1967, all but a
dozen  hospitals  in  the  South  had  implemented  desegregation  rather  than  losing
Medicare funds. President Johnson’s plan of using Medicare as a means for achieving
social change had worked (Morone and Blumenthal 195-7). 
25 Medicaid, on the other hand, which was hastily added as Title XIX to the Social Security
Act, was constructed as “a conservative, sparse, uneven, and stigmatized program.” It is
based on a means test and funded “only by dint of national and state officials’ annual
good will.”  (Katz-Olson  24-6)  It  has  to  be  highlighted  that  Medicare  is  centralized,
whereas  the  funding  and  administration  of  Medicaid  is  split  between  the  federal
government  and  the  states.  In  this  sense,  the  latter  happily  combines  demands  of
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Southern Democrats with American federalism: the political system is used to satisfy
the  need  of  racial  conservatives  to  maintain  their  black  population  in  poverty  by
leaving to the states the administration and regulation of programs destined to the
poor. And because of this joint administration, the implementation of Medicaid took
much longer. By 1969, Arizona and Alaska still had not adopted Medicaid. As early as
1967,  federal  funding  had  been  seriously  capped:  the  federal  government  set  the
maximum eligibility levels that would receive federal funding. States were free to set
higher levels, but none did (Katz-Olson 31).13 
26 Thus health legislation as enacted by the Johnson administration was shaped by a very
“American”  political  context  that  differed greatly  from  the  situations  obtaining  in
Europe. Political traditions and a unique situation of racial division of the working class
prevented the creation of a comprehensive health care system, leading to Johnson’s
partial  solution  that  proved  lasting  and  resistant  to  reform,  a  solution  which  was
flawed from its inception and laid the foundations for future problems and inequalities.
 
A flaw-ridden public system
27 The first flaw is soaring health care costs that have become a central problem of the
American health care system. Medicare contributed to medical inflation because the
program contained no cost-control measures. The program did not contain incentives
for  medical  providers  to  decrease  their  charges  or  to  refrain  from  unnecessary
surgeries  or  treatments.  In the case of  Medicaid,  open-ended entitlement had been
capped rapidly, especially since federal spending had to match state spending, leading
some states to soaring expenses due to generous coverage of their population (Jansson
248-9).14 Subsequent Medicaid reforms have led to a greater shifting of costs to the
states and enactments of block grants in some areas, leading to increasing eligibility
restrictions  (Jansson  304).15 No  cost-reducing  incentive  was  built  into  Medicare,
however, leading to soaring costs, caused only in part by evolving technology (Jansson
248).  Before  the  introduction  of  diagnostics-related  groups  in  Medicare  to  finance
Medicare’s hospital fees in 1983 under president Reagan, Medicare cost control was
ignored at two levels (Jansson 304, 320).  To ensure the AMA’s collaboration, Wilbur
Mills  had  promised  that  doctors,  even  within  hospitals,  could  charge  their  private
praxis fees on Medicare, thus making the program far more expensive (Morone and
Blumenthal 194). In addition, Medicare was reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis that
encouraged the multiplication of tests and procedures contributing to an increasingly
costly system (Starr 48). Bluntly put, Medicare had become a means for the health care
industry to milk the federal government.
28 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 introduced Medicare Part C, providing Part A and B
benefits through  subsidized  private  insurance  plans.  Once  more,  a  Democratic
President, Bill Clinton, did the work that Republicans had not managed to achieve.16
Eventually, it was president George W. Bush who managed to further reform Medicare,
where  Reagan  had  failed.  The  2003  Medicare  Prescription  Drug,  Improvement,  and
Modernization  Act moved ever  more  Medicare  beneficiaries  to  the  private  insurance
market.  It  also  introduced  Medicare  Part  D  that  covers  prescription  drugs  on  a
subsidized and voluntary basis (Office of Retirement…; Howard 31). But both additions
also  had  major  flaws  and  would  prove  costly  for  both  the  beneficiaries  and  the
taxpayers. This dismantling of the Welfare State, be it through privatization or through
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reducing programs into temporary assistance, shows the enduring nature of Reagan’s
ideological heritage.17 Something similar happened in the UK. Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher  did  not  achieve  fundamental  health  care  reform,  although  it  must  be
mentioned that funding was significantly cut under her leadership.  It  was the 2012
Health and Social Care Act that finally extended privatization to half of the NHS hospital
beds. As with Reagan, the Thatcher legacy proves a lasting one and has fundamentally
altered and shaped the discourse about taxes and social policies (Dorling 241; Walker
297).
29 Medicare Part D contained the infamous and expensive “doughnut hole”: beneficiaries
had to pay ¼ of the drug costs between $250 and $2,250, all of the cost from $2,550 to
$5,100, and 5% of the cost above that amount. Additional insurance for the doughnut
hole could not be purchased, thus making it a further incentive for the elderly to move
on  to  private  insurance  rolls.  These  incentives  had  already  been  increased  by  the
transformation  of  Part  C  into  Medicare  Advantage.  However,  these  government
subsidized private plans were yet another means for private companies to get more
money out of the government: on average, those plans cost $1,000 more per person per
annum than a traditional Medicare coverage (Starr 149-50).
30 At  the  inception  of  Medicare,  the  AMA  had  pressured  government  into  allowing
physicians  to  charge  higher  fees  than  what  was  covered,  leaving  beneficiaries
sometimes with high copayments. Combined with the “scanty” coverage provided by
traditional  Medicare  (Office  of  Retirement…),18 many  elderly  are  forced  to  an
alternative tactic in case of serious illness and need of chronic nursing home care: the
depletion of assets that allows them to move on to the Medicaid rolls (Jansson 248).
These persons are referred to as dual-eligible beneficiaries. This creates yet another
problem: these elderly persons inflate the costs of Medicaid, but, in the public mind,
they are covered by Medicare, which is perceived as “earned” benefits. The costs of
Medicaid,  however,  are among the constant  arguments  to  restrict  eligibility  and to
create measures for cutting the rolls. These measures usually affect people who are not
responsible for the high costs (Katz-Olson 213). This way, the problem of Medicare costs
became a major problem for Medicaid, since this makes the program more vulnerable.
31 But  Medicaid’s  vulnerability  also  stems  from  the  way  in  which  it  is  administered.
Medicaid is managed by the states and federal grants match state grants. Thus a state
that is not willing to spend much on its poor will receive less money than a state that is
willing to spend more, leaving people deprived at both state and federal level (Howard
179; Gilens 25).19 This state administration leads to very diverse Medicaid programs,
with fifty separate state government plans which change often. As political scientist
Laura Katz-Olson humorously puts it:  “If you’ve seen one Medicaid program, you’ve
seen one Medicaid program.” (Katz-Olson 1) Differences exist at all  levels:  from the
amount of funding and eligibility levels, to regulations and involved health industries
(Jansson 248-9). This diversity also leads to staggering inequalities among beneficiaries
between states.  A  person eligible  for  Medicaid in  one state  might  not  be so  in  the
neighboring  state.  This  creates  a  deep  inequality  between  Medicare  and  Medicaid,
leaving Medicaid exposed to restrictions due to state political ideology, making it  a
vulnerable program. The more conservative state governments is, the lower are the
benefits people receive (Gilens 25). Most of the states with very low eligibility levels, in
particular for parents (childless adults were excluded prior to the enactment of the
Affordable Care Act), are in the South.
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32 In contrast, in Germany there is virtually no state variation, despite the great variety of
health insurance companies (still  131 today). They have to operate within the same
standardized framework and have  to  act  in  the  same way for  many aspects.  Some
critics deplore this lack of flexibility (Gerlinger and Burkhardt). Strong federal control
also  exists  within the US system:  Medicare is  nationally  administered and presents
nearly no state variations.
33 Moreover, this two-tracked health care system has created two distinct constituencies
of  beneficiaries.  One  of  the  reasons  of  Medicare’s  longevity  is  the  powerful  AARP
(American  Association  of  Retired  Persons).  The  AARP  was  among  the  fiercest  and
loudest opponents to Reagan’s plan to cut Social Security and Medicare and largely
managed to defeat his reform proposals (Brownlee and Graham 8-9). On the contrary,
because  of  its  less  politically  active  constituency,  the  1981  cuts  in  Medicaid  under
Reagan went largely unopposed, although the Reagan cuts included a 5% cap on the
growth of the federal Medicaid share paid to the states, which made the program closer
to a block grant program than an entitlement program (Slessarev 359).
34 The strong political involvement of American senior citizens through the AARP allows
for a clear contrast with Europe. In most European countries, care for the elderly, or
rather its associated costs, is a frequently mentioned problem. For example, in the UK,
the elderly and their associated health care costs are perceived as an economic burden
creating a crisis in the Welfare State. In fact, this constant framing of the elderly as a
burden has led to the political alienation of a significant part of the retired population
in the UK (Thane 139-40). This stands in sharp contrast with the American situation,
where the AARP is a major player in health care policy and a dynamic political element.
35 Medicaid, on the other hand, has a rather politically inactive and diverse constituency.
Constant reforms change the beneficiaries, which is further complicated by the varying
eligibility  levels  of  the  different  states,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  pin  down  the
description of the average beneficiary. This makes mobilization on behalf of Medicaid
more difficult  (Howard 33-4;  Katz-Olson 181;  Jansson 291).20 An analysis  by political
scientist  Andrea  Louise  Campbell  shows  that  the  mobilization  of  senior  citizens  is
partly fuelled by the high stakes they have in Social Security and Medicare. She also
highlights  the  link  between  low  income  and  low  education  with  low  political
participation (Campbell 30, 32), Medicaid beneficiaries being, by definition, low-income
populations, explains why mobilization on behalf of Medicaid is less active.
36 In addition, the health care system as devised by the Johnson administration also laid
the foundation for a racialization of the two programs. As mentioned earlier, the racial
division of  the American working class is  one of  the aspects that set  the American
health care and social policy history apart from that of other industrialized countries.
It also can be said that racialization makes a unique tool for hampering the expansion
of social policy and for cutting back existing programs.
37 Administration  and  funding  created  two  programs  that  are  perceived  in  distinct
manners. Medicare is largely perceived as a “good” program whose beneficiaries have
“earned” their benefits through lifelong contributions (notwithstanding the fact that
the program pays out more than individuals have contributed and is  partly funded
through general  tax revenues).  Medicaid,  on the other  hand,  has  a  less  prestigious
status.  Katz-Olson  explains  that  “Medicaid  was  initially  considered  Medicare’s
friendless  stepchild,  created  in  its  shadow  and  catering  to  a  politically  powerless
clientele.”  Her  findings  show  that  media  coverage  of  Medicaid  generally  adopts  a
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negative tone and describes a program that is out of control. Moreover, Medicaid is
often part  of  partisan conflict  regarding the administration of  the program, and in
particular over funding and benefit levels. This “has stirred up fears of fiscal disaster
and images of unworthy clients taking advantage of taxpayer dollars.” (Katz-Olson 1,
11) Despite Republican attacks on the program, it remains somewhat popular with the
population. A 2011 Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 47% of Americans oppose
spending cuts in Medicaid (although it was still the program getting the least popular
support), and 39% of respondents declared that the program was important for them
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). 
38 Political scientist Martin Gilens has tried to bring clarity into an American paradox.
Although people claim to be supportive of social policies and help for the needy, they
oppose a wide range of measures, especially if those are labeled ‘welfare.’(Katz-Olson
131;  Gilens 30,  200)21 Gilens explains that this  is  due to a certain perception of  the
welfare recipient that has developed in the American public mind since the mid-1960s.
This picture is one of an able-bodied black adult using welfare as a substitute for self-
reliance. The perception is clearly one of the average welfare recipient as the lazy Black
lacking work ethic. Hence the idea that most welfare recipients are undeserving and
actually do not need the government’s help, although Americans support government
help for the deserving (Gilens 2-3, 36, 62-3, 67-8, 80, 187, 191).22 In short, social policies
are racialized and opponents of social policies use race to argue for further cuts in the
program.23
39 This  image  of  undeserving  minorities  as  parasitic  beneficiaries  builds  on  facts.
Although  in  absolute  numbers  whites  represent  the  majority  of  beneficiaries,  the
picture  is  slightly  different  when  looking  at  it  in  proportion  to  the  size  of  the
communities. Minorities, particularly African-Americans and Latinos, are the poorest
communities in the US.24 This means they are the most likely to benefit from means-
tested  programs.25 This  proportional  overrepresentation  of  minorities  allows  for  a
racialized presentation of the program. The strong racialization of social policies, and
health care in particular, might be the most distinctive element shaping the American
system. 
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Figure 1: Medicaid Populations by Race, 2009
Adapted from CMS.gov. 2015 and US Census Bureau.
40 Blacks represent 21% of the Medicaid population, but they represent only 12% of the
total population. Contrariwise, whites represent 37% of the Medicaid population, but
63% of the total population (see Figure 1). This allows for this presentation of Medicaid
as a program for minorities.
41 The  emergency  plan  devised  by  the  Johnson  administration  created  a  particular
situation for American health care, be it in its development, shape, or possibility for
future  reform.  The  fragmentation  of  American  health  care  between  a  divided
constituency and stakeholders’ interests created a logjam for years making health care
a recurrent reform project,  as well  as a recurrent political failure. Some argue that
Conservatives saw the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare as a means to prevent a
national health care system (Katz-Olson 28). 
42 The  lack  of  comprehensiveness  of  the  Medicare-Medicaid  system  has  often  been
pointed out as an American flaw. The majority of the American population relies on
private  insurance  because  the  two  programs  only  cover  two  distinct  parts  of  the
population: the elderly and the very poor. In 2009, only 30.6% of the total population
was covered by government health insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, or military health
insurance).  64.5%  of  the  population  relied  on  private  insurance,  56.1%  of  them
benefited from employer insurance. Strong racial disparities apply here as well: 73.2%
of the white population have private insurance, 62.7% of the white population have
employer health insurance.  This is  the case for only 49.3% of the black population,
where only 45.2% have employer insurance. The figures are even lower for Hispanics:
only  40.7%  of  the  Hispanic  population  has  private  insurance,  and  only  37.2% have
employer insurance. The uninsured rates also greatly vary depending on the different
populations. In 2009, only 11.5% of the white population had no health insurance, but
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20.3% of the black population lacked coverage, as did 31.6% of the Hispanic population
(De Navas-Walt et al. 77-81). Thus the different racial populations of the US have very
different stakes in health care reform and minorities are more in need of government
responsiveness and health care reform because they rely less on the private market.
43 The situation in the US is not isolated. European states did not all immediately enact
comprehensive  and  universal  health  care.  France,  for  example,  only  progressively
offered universal coverage, progressively including populations such as students, war
widows, jobless persons, and interns between 1945 and 1978. Covered services were also
extended, but in a piecemeal fashion and by population sectors (Elbaum 43-4.).
 
Obama Facing A Minefield
44 President Barack Obama made health care the major issue of his presidency and took a
great risk doing so because he faced a political minefield. American health care history
was characterized by nearly one century of  failures to enact  comprehensive health
reform. The piecemeal system that emerged from successive waves of reform remains
complex. This makes the system prone to misunderstandings and misrepresentations
and it makes it difficult for the population to understand their interests in the system
(Starr 10-1). To this must be added the fact that the health care constituency is divided
along  racial  and  class  lines,  making  it  more  difficult  to  effectively  address  health
inequalities. 
45 Health care plays a central role in economic well-being (Wysong et al. 16, 79-80, 90).
Minorities,  and  especially  African-Americans,  face  particular  health  conditions  that
distinguish  them  from  the  rest  of  the  population.26 Moreover,  since  the  African-
American middle class is more fragile than the white one, they are more likely to face
personal bankruptcy and loss of middle class status after serious illness.27
46 The will of the Obama administration to make health care more accessible for the poor
and improve benefits was (and is) threatened by the negative image of Medicaid and its
administration system.
47 The  Clinton  health  reform  debacle,  spearheaded  by  Hillary  Clinton  during  her
husband’s presidency, showed that the creation of unity, both among reformers and
the public,  was paramount in achieving reform. Obama had a similar situation:  the
public apparently supported health care reform by a wide margin, even progressive
health care reform. A New York Times poll in June 2009 found that 85% of respondents
thought that the health care system needed to be changed. 72% of the respondents
even supported “something like Medicare” for people under age 65, with only 20% of
respondents opposing such a government-run system. The same poll found that even
50%  of  the  respondents  identifying  as  Republicans  supported  a  public  plan.  This
support should not be overestimated,  however,  as  the same poll  found that 77% of
respondents  were  actually  satisfied  with  the  insurance  plans  they  had  (Sack  and
Connelly). A study by political scientists and statisticians Andrew Gelman, Daniel Lee,
and Yair Ghitza found that, regarding public opinion, Obama faced a situation similar to
Clinton’s in 1993-4. They also caution that “Opinion is notoriously volatile on issues
that are poorly defined in the public mind, and support of health care reform does not
necessarily translate to support for any particular policy.” (Gerlman et al. 2) What is
more, their analysis shows that support varies greatly according to age and income
categories. Not surprisingly, the higher the income, the higher the opposition to health
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care reform. More surprisingly, perhaps, is the fact that support for health care reform
also dwindles with age and decreases for people over age 60. The same age group was
also less in favor of increased government spending on health care for the uninsured
and  on  health  care  insurance  in  general  (Gerlman  et  al.  7-8).  In  other  words,  a
population that could have been viewed as an ally for health care reform, the elderly,
who  already  benefit  from  a  government-run  plan,  are  among  those  less  likely  to
support  reform  and  an  expansion  of  benefits  like  theirs  to  other  parts  of  the
population.
48 It has already been pointed out that the population categories most in need of health
care  reform,  younger  Americans  in  the  lower  income  brackets,  and  especially
minorities, are among the less politically active populations. Political scientist Larry M.
Bartels pointed out that Congress tends to be more responsive to its richer voters and
insisted  on  “the  real  limitations  of  public  opinion as  a  basis  for  democratic  policy
making.”  (Bartels  6,  27-8)  Thus,  support  for  health  care  reform cannot  predict  the
outcome of the reform proposal.
49 Gelman et al.’s analysis shows that, according to a survey in March 2010, support for
Obama’s reform proposal was only 46%, while 48% opposed it. This support was sharply
divided along partisan lines: 81% of Obama voters supported the proposal, while 90% of
McCain voters opposed it (Gelman et al. 9). Obama was elected in 2008 with a majority
of 52.9% of the popular vote (Roper Center 2014). This majority does not seem all that
great when taking into account the sharp partisan division regarding the support for
the  health  care  reform  proposal,  especially  when  considering  that the  proposal
managed 9  percentage  points  less  support  from Obama supporters  than opposition
from McCain supporters. What seemed like an overwhelming support for health care
reform, with about 85% of people saying in 2009 that the system needed change, was
reduced to 45% of support for the actual proposal (Jones). A 2012 analysis of public
opinion regarding health care by political scientist Michael Tesler found that opinions
concerning health care reform were racialized, as racial resentment played a stronger
influence in the rejection of Obama’s reform proposal than it did for Clinton’s. In a
short time span, attitudes changed between 2007 and 2009 and became more racialized
once Obama had become the spokesperson for the health care reform proposal. Two
elements stand out: support for the health care reform was divided along racial lines,
with 83% of the black population supporting the Obama reform in 2009-2010, compared
with  38% of  whites.  This  racial  polarization  was  less  sharp  for  the  Clinton  reform
proposal in 1993-4: 69% of blacks supported the Clinton reform compared with 43% of
whites. In September 2007, the most racially resentful respondents preferred private
health insurance over government-run health insurance by 30% compared to the least
racially resentful respondents. This increased to 60% by November 2009, when Obama
had become the  spokesperson  for  the  health  care  reform (Tesler  696,  698,  701).  It
appears then that the rejection of strong government involvement in health care, be it
through a single payer system or in the form of the public option, is partly motivated
by racial resentment.
50 This lack of support for a specific proposal is further complicated by the fact that the
American system has effectively fragmented the health care constituents into different
groups with different stakes: the poor needed a Medicaid expansion and improvement,
whereas  the  elderly  feared  a  loss  of  benefits,  but  they  still  needed  a  Medicare
improvement,  especially  regarding the  doughnut  hole.28 56% of  the  population was
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insured  through  their  employers  in  2009  (Proctor  et  al.  77),  and  unions  had  their
privileges.  Progressives  made demands for  government options for  health care and
some supported a single-payer system as in Canada. 
51 This fragmented public opinion and health care constituency landscape meant that the
apparently  overwhelming  support  for  health  care  could  be  easily  fragmented  and
destabilized, just as was the case for Clinton in 1993-4.29
52 Moreover, the Obama administration had to deal with powerful health interest groups
that had successfully opposed health care reform in the past. Among those are PhRMA,
AHIP,  AMA,  AHA,  small  businesses,  etc.30 The  system  had  allowed  the  health  care
industries to enrich themselves, making them fierce opponents of reform. The system
has accurately been described as a trap. Despite its obvious flaws, the public was just
satisfied enough to be afraid of losing their advantages, making people wary of reform
(Starr 2).
53 The passage of the ACA was a historic victory, although this can be easily overlooked.
Health  reform  was  declared  dead  several  times,  but  Democrats  had  made  a
commitment and were determined. Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House and a key
player in the health care reform said: “You go through the gate. If the gate’s closed, you
go over the fence. If the fence is too high, we’ll pole-vault in. If that doesn’t work, we’ll
parachute  in.  But  we’re  going  to  get  health  care  reform  passed  for  the  American
people.” (Qtd. in Kirsch 4) The resulting Act reflects Pelosi’s words, because the reform
was severely maimed by ideological and political assaults. Many concessions were made
initially  because the Obama administration wanted to  create a  bipartisan bill.  Even
though it rapidly became apparent that bipartisanship was more a matter of wishful
thinking  than  reality,  the  Democratic  majority  in  Congress,  and  especially  in  the
Senate, was not strong enough and ideologically unified to achieve a truly progressive
reform. Despite their non-participation in the reform debates, Republicans managed to
impact  the  bill  through  two  means:  by  unsettling  public  opinion  and  by  later
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA.
54 Although Obama’s  reform is  rather  centrist  and was  aimed at  achieving  bipartisan
support, it still got him called a ‘socialist’.  Several Democratic members of Congress
deplored the lack of Republican participation. Representative Robert E. Andrews (D-NJ)
said: “I’m disappointed that the Republicans did not meaningfully participate in the
process of writing this bill. They were given ample opportunity to do so.” (Andrews)
Representative  Bart  Gordon  (D-TN)  even  regretted  the  attempts  made  at
bipartisanship, given the almost total absence of success:
He [Obama] was, I’m afraid, a bit naïve at that time, thinking that there could be
bipartisanship. He never received it, and still hasn’t. So, and I think that he wasted
some of his time in the presidency […] it’s a good instinct, I’m glad that he tried, but
it was an effort that wasn’t going to be successful. (Gordon) 
55 Representative  Earl  Pomeroy  (D-ND)  has  a  somewhat  harsher  assessment  of  the
situation, sparing neither of the two parties:
Democrats did not reach out meaningfully. We wanted to drag a Republican or two
in, so we could claim it was bipartisan, but basically we did not reach out to the
other side. Now, the other side also made it clear, right from the beginning, they
weren’t going to play, they almost double-dared us to do this, and there was much
more interest in the political damage that they could inflict on the Party, than try
to make the bill acceptable by any goals they had for health reform. (Pomeroy)
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56 Former Representative John Tierney (D-MA) said that Democrats encountered a total
refusal from Republicans, who, even though they said that they wanted a different type
of reform, made no recommendations. According to Tierney, Republicans only focused
on the overreach of government (Tierney). In a 2016 article published in the Journal of
the American Medical  Association,  Obama denounced Republicans’  “hyperpartisanship”
and  he  insisted  on  the  fact  that  Republicans  refused  their  own  ideas,  such  as  the
individual mandate, but also others, when they were presented in the context of the
health  care  reform proposed  by  the  Obama administration  (Obama 2016:  530).  The
refusal  at  bipartisan  collaboration  also  highlights  the  strong  political  polarization
around social  policies,  which often revolves around different conceptions about the
role  and  scope  of  government.  The  accusations  of  a  ‘socialist’  reform  denote  the
rejection of a strong federal government and lead to the rhetorical use of the embedded
notion of Big Government.31 This is one of the reasons why the single-payer system,
where the federal government manages all the health care costs, was never an option.
Most  congresspeople  were  against  single  payer  out  of  electoral  calculation.  Former
Representative Bart Gordon admitted that, in retrospect, a single payer system might
have  been  a  better  approach,  but  that  at  that  time  it  was  “politically  undoable.”
(Gordon) Former Representative Earl Pomeroy shared this assessment of the political
situation: “It’s impossible to achieve politically. You can only do that which you can
pass and get the population to accept. And so moving from where we were to single
payer was not going to happen.” (Pomeroy) Although public opinion polls showed that
a vast  majority  of  Americans,  about 70%,  criticized the existing health care system
overall, only 20% were dissatisfied with their care and 40% were dissatisfied with costs
at  a  personal  level.  Hence  congresspeople  feared  electoral  consequences  if  they
supported a disruptive reform (Jacobs and Scocpol 89-90).
57 Even among progressives there was no majority in support of a single-payer system, as
explained by Richard Kirsch, one of the activists of HCAN! (Kirsch 68).32 HCAN! feared
that  single  payer  would  frighten  public  opinion  and  play  into  the  hands  of
conservatives. Instead they chose to support the public option alternative (Kirsch 38,
80).33 Despite comparative studies that have shown the advantages and especially the
cost-saving possibilities of the single payer system of their North American neighbors,
strong  anti-statist  ideology  prevented  the  mere  discussion  of  a  system akin  to  the
Canadian one. Despite the lack of media coverage, single payer still  has supporters,
however, even in Congress. Yardly Pollas, senior legislative director for Representative
Bobby Rush (D-IL), said that the congressman favored single payer as a better solution
that  would  allow  for  fewer  inequalities  (Pollas  2016).  Dan  Riffle,  health  advisor  to
Representative  John  Conyers  (D-MI),  explained  the  congressman’s  long-standing
interest in single payer as a means to achieve truly universal health coverage, dating
back to the sixties when universal health care was advocated as part of the fight for
civil rights. Rep. Conyers has been working toward introducing again a proposal for
single payer (Riffle 2016).
58 Progressives had endorsed the public option as an alternative to single payer. Leaving
the choice between private and government-run insurance was supposed to deflect
attacks about a government takeover on health care. However, the public option very
quickly became controversial. Among others, it was attacked by AHIP and Blue Shield
Blue Cross, who are among the biggest insurers, because they feared the competition.
Although Obama hesitantly supported the public option, it was eventually killed in the
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Senate (Kirsch 80-1, 112-3, 137, 161, 285; Jacobs and Skocpol 70-3, 80). At this stage of
the debates, bipartisanship had long been abandoned and it was eventually a handful of
conservative Democrats who defeated the public option in the Senate,34 as well as the
proposal for a national health exchange (Klein; Mendelberg; Edsall and Edsall 12, 19, 71,
138;  Brimes  66;  Heclo  27-9;  Kirsch  161,  289).  The  health  exchanges  would  be
administered at state level instead (Skocpol 99).35
59 Several congressmen highlighted the fact that the centrist move of the reform was, to a
great  extent,  due  to  the  ideological  diversity  on  the  Democratic  side.  Former
Representative Robert E. Andrews summarized it as follows: 
We had some Democrats who didn’t  vote for the bill,  they had various reasons,
some of them frankly thought that it didn’t go far enough, they wanted a single-
payer health system like Canada has, others thought it went too far and they didn’t
want the taxes in the bill to help to pay for the extended coverage, other Democrats
felt that it was a politically disadvantageous vote in their district and might cost
them their election, and in fact it did cost some of them their election. (Andrews)
60 According  to  former  Representative  Bart  Gordon,  the  conservative  outreach  of  the
reform was more to convince conservative Democrats than Republicans (Gordon). Even
Representatives who voted for the ACA were dissatisfied with it. Representative John F.
Tierney expressed his disappointment over the ACA saying that, by the end, it was clear
that it was the “Senate bill or no bill at all,” despite the fact that many would have liked
to see a more progressive reform (Tierney). The threat of a Republican filibuster and
the ensuing need of a solid 60-votes majority was enough to give the more moderate
and conservative Democrats in the Senate disproportionate leverage. Political scientists
Theda Skocpol and Lawrence Jacobs explained that the political exploitation of every
negotiation  between  Democrats  by  “Republicans  [who]  cried  “wolf”  at  each  step,
ma[de]  normal  legislative  deal  making  visible  to  an  increasingly  anxious  and
bewildered public.” (Jacobs and Skocpol 62-4) The impact of this highly publicized and
protracted  reform  process  must  not  be  underestimated.  Jacobs  and  Shapiro
demonstrated that the focus on disagreement and disputes during a reform process
contributed to unsettle the public and made public opinion turn against the Clinton
reform (Jacobs and Shapiro xvi,  65).  During the Obama health care reform process,
Senators from moderate or conservative states especially feared for their reelection
prospects should they support a reform judged as too progressive. This was for example
the case of Senator Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas (Jacobs and Skocpol 62).
61 In  this  sense,  by  destabilizing  public  opinion  and making  Democrats  fear  for  their
reelection prospects, the sharp Republican opposition managed to significantly impact
the ACA and contributed to make it more centrist than many would have liked it to be,
despite initial public opinion polls that appeared favorable to a major reform.
62 Former  Representative  John  Tierney  also  pointed  out  that  the  death  of  Senator
Kennedy had a huge impact on the bill. In his opinion, Kennedy’s expertise, authority,
and political savviness would have allowed for a much more progressive bill (Tierney).
Conservative  Democrats  in  the  House  threatened  to  withdraw  their  support  if
government funds could be used to cover abortions.  On the other hand, pro-choice
supporters threatened the reform, should abortion rights not be included (Kirsch 272-3,
275).36 Eventually  the  Stupak-Amendment  was  added,  but  even  so,  anti-abortion
Democrats  pushed  President  Obama  into  signing  an  additional  executive  order
prohibiting the use of federal funds for abortions (Kantor 2010).
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63 It has already been mentioned that health care provider interests have been among the
traditional opponents of health care reform in the US. They succeeded repeatedly in
defeating  reform  efforts,  which  is  why  Obama  made  sure  to  invite  them  to  the
negotiations table, much to the resentment of progressive pressure groups (Kirsch 133,
148,  156).  Longstanding  opponents,  such  as  the  AMA and  AHA,  had  been  mollified
through  the  promises  of  universal  coverage  and  the  ensuing  prospects  of  new
customers  that  would  more  than  make  up  for  the  small  income  loss  due  to  new
regulations,  such  as  caps  on  insurance  premiums  and  out-of-pocket  contributions.
PhRMA was won over by special promises (that were in contradiction with campaign
promises) that there would be no competition from generic drugs and no importation
of  cheaper  drugs  from  other  countries.  In  return,  PhRMA  invested  in  pro-reform
advertisement ( Jacobs and Skocpol 70-3). AHIP proved to be a tougher opponent. It was
among those who managed to kill the public option, but enraged at the weakening of
the  penalties  for  non-compliance  with  the  individual  mandate  (the  obligation  to
contract health insurance), which was obtained by the Republicans. AHIP feared that
they would only (sic) obtain 94% of the population as customers. Ironically, AHIP, with
its  long  history  of  opposition  to  government  action  on  health  reform,  actually
complained about “too little government.” ( Jacobs and Skocpol 73-4)
64 The remaining government intervention and regulation that the ACA provided for was
challenged by Republicans. The 2012 Sebelius lawsuit, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services 648 F. 3d 1235, attacked the
constitutionality  of  the  individual  mandate,  which  was  eventually  declared
constitutional by the Supreme Court. The ironical feature of this conservative attack
against  the  ACA  is  that,  initially,  the  individual  mandate  was  a  conservative  idea
introduced in the Republican health reform proposal to oppose the 1993 Clinton plan
(Jacobs and Shapiro 135).  The individual mandate is  also at the heart of  the much-
praised Massachusetts health care system enacted by Republican Mitt Romney. When
Democrats proposed the same idea, Republicans denounced it as “big government” and
as an attack on personal liberty (Jacobs and Skocpol 91).
65 It  has already been demonstrated that conservative opposition and outright attacks
against too much government involvement took its toll on the health insurance system
devised for the ACA: single payer was never really considered, the public option was
abandoned. The ACA had thus to rely on several means to achieve universal coverage of
the population.  One of  those means is  the extension of  Medicaid,  the public  health
insurance program for the poor,  to all  people,  including able-bodied adults without
children, which were previously excluded from the program, and for incomes up to
133% FPL.37 This extension was the other element, besides the individual mandate, that
was challenged in the 2012 Sebelius lawsuit against the ACA. It  was argued that the
federal government had no right to penalize non-compliance with the new Medicaid
extension with the loss of all federal Medicaid funds, depriving states of over 10% of
their budget (National Federation of Independent Business… 2012). The Supreme Court
ruled against the ACA and the Medicaid extension became optional, allowing once more
the  most  conservative  states  to  restrict  Medicaid  eligibility.38 This  had  a  negative
impact at two levels: on the universality of coverage and on the black population.
66 The universality of coverage was threatened by this, because the ACA relied on this
extension to cover the poorest populations. First results have shown that the uninsured
rates in the states without the Medicaid extension is still significantly higher than in
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the states having adopted the extension (Kaiser Family Foundation 2016b) (see Figures
2 and 3).
 
Figure 2. Uninsured rates by states, in percent (2013)
Adapted from the Kaiser Family Foundation.
 
Figure 3. Uninsured rates by states, in percent (2015)
Adapted from the Kaiser Family Foundation.
Idiosyncrasies of the 2010 Affordable Care Act from a Comparative Perspective
Angles, 4 | 2017
18
67 This had a clear impact on the poorest populations, and especially on the “working
poor,” i.e. people who work full time but do not manage to earn a sufficient living due
to  low  wages  and  who  have  to  forego  health  insurance.  This  decision  had  a
disproportionately negative impact on blacks because Republican states, particularly in
the South, did not implement the Medicaid extension, although it was fully financed at
a federal level until 2017, and then slowly phased down to 90% of federal funding by
2020. As of January 2017, 19 states still have not adopted the Medicaid extension (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2017c). These 19 states39 concentrate 38.4% of the total American
population, but 48.3% of the black population. Before Louisiana adopted the Medicaid
extension in 2015 to be effective in 2016, the 20 states concentrated 51.8% of the total
black population, compared with 39.9% of the total American population. The impact
for Hispanics is not disproportionate in the 19 states, however, as 37.9% of the total
Hispanic population lives in these states, which is slightly lower than the concentration
rate of the total American population (see Figure 4).40
 




 19 non-Medicaid states 31 Medicaid states
Total population 38.4 61.6
White population 38 62
Black population 48.3 51.7
Hispanic population 37.9 62.1
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Figure 5. Medicaid eligibility levels for childless adults and density of the black population by state,
in percent, 2014
Data: Medicaid.gov, Census.gov.
68 It  can  be  estimated  that  the  black  and  the  Hispanic  populations  suffer
disproportionately from the non-extension of Medicaid in these states because they are
among the poorest populations in the US (see Figure 5). In 2015, 21.7% of the black
population was in the lowest income brackets (up to an annual income of $15,000 and
thus  eligible  for  the  Medicaid  extension)  and  13.6%  of  the  Hispanic  population,
compared with 9.3% of the white population (Proctor et al. 25-6, 29).41
69 The more fragile status of Medicaid has been proved once again through the Sebelius
decision  and  the  ensuing  refusal  of  a  significant  number  of  states  to  adopt  the
extension.  It  is  understandable  then that  black  Congressmen in  particular,  such as
Representative Rush or Representative Conyers, favored single payer because such a
system would not allow for this type of inequality in health care access (Pollard, Riffle).
42
70 Democratic  congresspeople  deplored  the  setback  that  this  decision  represented.
Andrews said:  “I  respectfully think that the Supreme Court got that bit  wrong. But
because it’s the Supreme Court, their decision is final, it’s final for all of us and we got
this.” Pomeroy admitted that, at first, advocates may not have realized the heavy blow
the law had taken in this Supreme Court decision: “We were so happy the whole law
hadn’t been tossed out, and it came very, very close to being tossed out, that, I think,
there was maybe not enough attention paid about the terrible hit the law had taken.”
He then explains why Democrats did not immediately realize the extent of the damage:
“We really didn’t imagine that a… that Republican governors trying to extract the last
bit  of  political  advantage from this,  what had become a very unpopular bill,  would
refuse a hundred percent funding from the federal government to cover their poor
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people. We really didn’t imagine that level of venal and evil behavior in the name of
politics.” (Pomeroy)
71 Another divisive issue raised its head. The more liberal Democrats and some Hispanic
congresspeople  wanted  undocumented  immigrants  to  be  able  to  purchase  health
coverage  through  the  new  health  exchanges.  More  conservative  and  moderate
Democrats were opposed to this. Republicans helped to fuel the debate. It was clear
that an inclusion of illegal immigrants would expose the reform to even harsher attacks
(Olivo; Skocpol and Jacobs 100; CNN 2009a; Kirsch 241-2, 342; Starr 240, 246).43
72 The  planned  premium  cap  on  high-premium  employer-sponsored  health  insurance
plans, dubbed the ‘Cadillac-Tax,’ was one of the features of the reform designed to help
make health care more affordable for the lower income population. But this tax was
strongly opposed by the unions because their members were among the beneficiaries of
those plans (Kirsch 111, 320; Starr 7,  75, 122, 258).44 Once again, the position of the
unions, focused on their immediate special interest, proved damaging to the rest of the
population (Jacobs and Skocpol 95). After bringing their support once the Cadillac Tax
was delayed, unions resumed their opposition to the ACA. Some of their reproaches
were based on legitimate concerns about the undesired effects of some ACA provisions.
The  ACA  has  one  unintended  effect  on  unions:  it  weakened  their  membership.
Historically,  many  workers  joined  unions  because  of  their  health  care  bargaining
capacities.  The  health  exchanges  and  new  regulations  made  this  less  appealing.
Moreover,  unions resented some of  the redistributive aspects  of  the reform.  Union
members pay taxes that help subsidize lower-income families’ health insurance, but
their high-benefit high-cost plans are not subsidized (Roy).45 
73 These examples show that  the attitude of  the unions has not  significantly changed
since they helped undermine FDR’s attempts to introduce health care. Their position is
a good example of the general zero-sum game fears raised by the health care reform,
which pitch various interest groups against each other. This is also a manifestation of
the racialization of social policies: when redistributive issues are tackled, the specter of
racial group competition looms. These issues were also mentioned by Earl Pomeroy,
former  Representative  of  North  Dakota,  an  at-large  district  with  poverty  issues.
Regarding the need of addressing racial inequalities, he said, “I mean, of course, I don’t
want  to  go  back  to  North  Dakota,  95%  white  population,  saying,  we  have  special
provisions where if you’re an ethnic, if you’re a racial minority, you get to step to the
front of the line. I mean, it wasn’t going to pass.” (Pomeroy) However, along with other
Congressmen  from  states  in  similar  situations,  he  managed  to  secure  the  Frontier
Amendment, which increased Medicare reimbursement in North and South Dakota, as
well as Montana, Wyoming, and Nevada. On the other hand, the better financing of
Medicaid  that  Senator  Ben  Nelson  from  Nebraska  initially  obtained  was  harshly
criticized by members of both parties and rapidly repealed (Lowrey),46 showing once
again that it  is  more difficult  to defend Medicaid than Medicare.  Louisiana Senator
Mary Landrieu, however, managed to carve out a Medicaid funding extension for her
state in exchange of her support for the health care reform bill. The additional federal
funding  for  Louisiana  was  restricted  to  that  state  under  the  provision  that  the
increased funding only applied to “states recovering from a major disaster.” (Fabia)
Section 2006 of the ACA provides for additional Medicaid funding for all 50 states and
the District of Columbia that have been declared by the president as a major disaster
state during the preceding 7 fiscal years, thus applying to Louisiana which was hit by
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hurricane Katrina in 2005. Senator Landrieu managed to save her additional Medicaid
funding despite  Republican attacks,  notably  because  she  was  backed by  Republican
Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal (Fabian). Senator Nelson’s special deal could not be
defended on similar grounds of heightened needs.
74 Intergroup competition is especially fierce in a context of perceived limited resources.
Since the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 and 1987, deficit control has become a
central feature of social-policy making, thus creating a de facto situation of limited
resources for all social policies. A Democratic bill that is not balanced has virtually no
chance to pass.47 Obama made deficit control a central feature of his reform, along with
cost control for patients, and worked closely with the CBO.48 These unending debates
about cost-control and deficit reduction made middle-class Americans and Medicare
beneficiaries fear that they would lose benefits but have to pay to extend coverage to
the poorer populations (Skocpol and Jacobs 97).49 This jeopardized their support for
Obama’s  health  reform  project.  The  Obama  administration  was  well  aware  of  the
critical role of the (white) middle class, especially after the Clinton disaster, especially
given that, since the 1990s, affording health care coverage has increasingly become a
middle-class problem (Wysong et al. 90).
75 As a result, the ACA strongly focuses on the middle class, for example by subsidizing
health coverage for families with incomes up to 400% FPL (ACA Title I sec. 1301, sec.
1311). This concerns a substantial part of the lower middle class,50 and addresses both
political and economic needs. The 1970s backlash against social policies has shown that
the  middle  class  is  less  and  less  willing  to  support  programs  for  the  poor  and
minorities, especially since the middle class, and in particular the lower middle class, is
doing increasingly poorly. Since the 1960s, the Democratic Party has increasingly been
identified  as  the  minority  party.  Many  white  working  and  lower  middle  class
Democratic voters have been feeling less represented by their party and have turned
towards the Republican Party.51 Moreover, since the 1970s the middle class status has
been eroding, and health care insurance is among the problems that emerged for the
middle class which has been facing sharply rising health care costs, which have started
to  become problematic  since  the  1990s.  Any  viable  reform needed to  address  both
issues:  to  help  the  lower  middle  class,  while  making  this  clear  and  obvious  at  the
political level.
76 The strong racialization of general social policies explains why the resulting legislation
uses virtually no race-specific language.52 Among the most conspicuous occurrences is
Sec. 10334, “Minority Health,” which re-affirms the Office for Minority Health. Among
the re-authorized missions are “improving minority health and the quality of health
care  minorities  receive,  and  eliminating  racial  and  ethnic  disparities.”  The  more
detailed  missions  include:  “community  outreach  activities,  language  services,
workforce cultural competence, and other areas as determined by the Secretary.“53 The
text  is  vague  and  addresses  issues  that  are  not  particularly  controversial.  Such
measures result in, for example, the availability of government websites in Spanish.
This  is  hardly  new  and  is  only  a  form  of  compliance  with  existing  legislation.
Nonetheless, the ACA has been attacked by some as favoring racial minorities, calling it
“affirmative action on steroids” in a poor attempt to appear witty, or an instance of
“redistribution  of  health”  (Velour;  Jeffrey).  Such attacks suggest  that  a  more  race-
specific bill would never have passed in Congress.54 Although deep inequalities along
race and class lines exist, at a political level, race-specific approaches are not seriously
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considered, as noted by Pomeroy who could not recall this issue being ever seriously
discussed during health care reform meetings (Pomeroy). Tierney pointed out that ACA
advocates tried as much as was possible to address the needs of minorities, but that the
neutrality and universal focus of the bill  was an absolute necessity (Tierney). These
positions and assessments of the political situation are by no means unique. Obama was
a long-time advocate of race-neutral/universal policies (Obama 2006: 247). Despite this
openly advocated neutrality, he was harshly criticized by racial conservatives for doing
too much, as shown in the examples above. But he was also harshly criticized for not
considering more race-specific measures (Bonilla-Silva 262, 265). Democratic Maryland
Representative Elijah E. Cummings criticized the president by saying that he could do
more for African-Americans, but also voiced optimism that he would do so in a near
future. The Congressional Black Caucus asked Obama to address the pressing needs of
the  African-American  community  (Stolberg;  Condon and O’Sullivan;  Brush).  Despite
these criticisms, the Congressional Black Caucus now officially supports the ACA and its
website  puts  forward  that  the  reform  helps  the  African-American  population
(Congressional  Black  Caucus  Foundation  2011)  even  if  it  is  framed  in  race-neutral
language.
77 Despite  the  existence  of  some  superficial  discussion  about  affirmative  action-type
policies in some European states and the passage of the Equality Act in 2010 in the UK
(Boéton),55 the American racial situation is unique, particularly when it comes to the
African-American population. The obvious differences between the US and Europe are,
first, the fact that African-Americans are not immigrants or recently descended from
immigrants, as is the case in Europe. Second, the issue of slavery and segregation make
the American situation unique. Alleviating the effects of past discrimination was among
the reasons for establishing race-specific policies like affirmative action. Despite the
ongoing  backlash  at  such  policies,  many  people  still  defend  them.  Nowadays,  the
argument to defend racial policies includes the persisting inequalities between black
and white communities (Anderson).56 To alleviate the effects of  past discrimination,
many academics and politicians advocate race-neutral but issue-specific policies, also
called race-pragmatic policies.57 Different arguments are put forward. Many think that
issue-specific  policies  have  a  deeper  impact  than  symptom-treating  policies  like
affirmative  action.58 They  also  claim  that  universal  policies  have  a  better  political
survival chance and are key to build a broad coalition transcending race and class in
order  to  achieve  a  reform-majority  (West  98;  Marable  xxv,  199;  Persons  1993b:  71;
Sniderman and Carmines 153; Skocpol 251). Political feasibility is among the factors
guiding this position, but this position is representative of the ideology of the post-civil
rights black politics (Persons 1993a: 38). Obama is a good example of this ‘new’ turn in
black politics.
78 Yet, political feasibility is just one aspect of the question. Supporters of race-specific
policies have one major argument on their side: although problems like health care and
education  are  universal  and  concern  the  whole  of  American  society,  those  issues
represent  a  far  greater  plight  for the  black  population  (De  Navas-Walt  et  al.  26).59
Contrary to  many European countries,  the  US does  not  consider  racial  statistics  as
discriminatory.60 Thus,  everybody,  including the government and the president, 61 is
well aware of the inequalities between populations and the dreadful situation of the
black population.62
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79 The ACA reflects both aspects of the racial issue. The overall framework is race-neutral,
except  for  the  few  elements  previously  mentioned.  This  aims  at  not  presenting  a
divisive  angle  in  the  reform  and  making  it  vulnerable  to  racial  group  conflicts  of
interest. And yet, the text also tackles some race-specific issues. Many of the reform
provisions are aimed at the poorest parts of the population which disproportionately
benefit African-Americans because they are concentrated at the lowest rungs of the
social ladder.63 The Medicaid extensions and subsidies for the purchase of insurance
mostly  benefit  minorities  and  especially  African-Americans,  for  instance.  The
improvement  of  Medicaid  benefits  would  greatly  benefit  blacks  as  well  because  a
disproportionate share of the population already relied on the program prior to 2010.64 
80 The ACA also expanded funding for community health centers that serve medically
underserved areas, both rural and urban. Because they serve people regardless of their
ability  to  pay,  these  community  health  centers  are  particularly  important  for
minorities. The funding had already been almost doubled under president George W.
Bush between 2002 and 2007 to almost $2 billion (McMorrow and Zuckerman 992).65 The
ACA expanded the funding further under sec. 10503. This funding was further increased
by sec. 2303 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (the second act
that constitutes Obamacare) to a total of $11 billion between 2011 and 2015, of which
$1.5 billion are dedicated to renovations and the construction of new centers. In 2015
the Department of Health and Human Services announced that under the ACA 700 new
community health center sites had already been built, and 266 new centers were to be
opened the same year (HHS 2015). This adds to the approximately 9,000 existing care
delivery sites distributed among 1,202 community health centers that existed in 2013
(Shin et al.). It has already been mentioned that, because of the structural overlapping
of race and class in the US and the ensuing concentration of the black population in the
lowest income brackets, measures targeting the poorest populations disproportionally
benefit  blacks.  Pomeroy  insisted  on  the  community  health  centers  as  one  way  to
address the specific needs of the black population (Pomeroy).
81 Another  way  of  dealing  with  life-threatening  problems  is  by  targeting  specific
pathologies.  The  major  causes  for  death  vary  greatly  between the  black  and white
populations (CDC 2011: 137-8).66 For example, the ACA pays particular attention to HIV/
AIDS and diabetes, both having epidemic proportions in the black population (CDC.67
The ACA focuses on STD prevention (sec. 2953), in a wider program for assistance for
pregnant  and  parenting  teens  that  also  includes  education  on  birth  control.
Considering  the  spread  of  HIV/AIDS,  high  infant  mortality  rates,  and  high  youth
pregnancy  rates  (CDC  2014a)68 in  the  black  population,  those  measures  are  sorely
needed.
82 Andrews said that they tried to address some specific health issues that represent a
wider  problem  for  the  American  health  system  but  particularly  affect  minority
populations, such as diabetes, asthma, and high infant mortality rates (Mathews 4).69
83 The fact that even such measures as trying to rein in the spread of HIV/AIDS have been
criticized by some racial  conservatives  as  catering to  the black community  (Jeffrey
2009)  bears  witness  to  the racial  tensions in  the US,  especially  when redistributive
policies are concerned.
84 Despite the progress that has been made thanks to the ACA, even Barack Obama admits
that the system still must be improved. Obama points, among others, to the ongoing
necessity  of  adjusting and balancing the insurance premiums,  of  further increasing
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insurer competition to bring down premium costs, of introducing a public plan at least
in areas with insufficient marketplace competition, and of bringing down drug costs.




85 The distinctive features of the American welfare state set it  apart from other post-
industrial  countries.  More specifically,  the division of American society along racial
lines  has  prevented  the  creation  of  truly  comprehensive social  programs,  further
entrenching social and economic inequalities. From its inception in 1965, the peculiar
public  health  system stemming from racial  divisions  in  the  American working  and
middle class  was unique in its  lack of  coverage and tremendous cost.  The ACA has
sought  to  address  those  shortcomings,  such  as  difficulties  to  purchase  health  care
insurance, or health inequalities between the different racial populations, while at the
same time dealing with the social and political constraints of the United States today.
The focus on the lower middle class and specific health issues allowed circumventing
some  of  the  opposition,  especially  against  social  policies  targeted  at  minorities.
However, it appears that the ACA is deeply shaped (or maimed) by those constraints
and almost a hundred years of failed health care reforms.
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NOTES
1. Evans stresses the fact that the major differences in Western world health care systems can be
found in the financing. The rest of the features are remarkably similar. In this sense, the US is
truly  exceptional.  In  most  countries,  the  funding  depends  on  the  type  of  benefit  (hospital,
physician, dentistry, and ophthalmology are the main categories). In the US, however, it depends
on the beneficiary. Moreover, the US is exceptional in its cost-to-care ratio: it shows [It is too
early to say if the ACA manages to solve the problem.] the greatest gap between the overall costs
of health care and the proportion of the population that receives care. A similar argument is
made by  political  scientist  Jacob Hacker  (2002).  Moreover,  Hacker  argues  that  the  American
welfare state is not reduced as many say, based on its high expenditure, and that a significant
part is to be found in the private sector.
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2. By excluding domestic and casual workers, the program would have excluded most minorities.
The same scheme was later used for Social Security. Domestic and agricultural workers were
finally made eligible in the 1950 Social Security reform.
3. Social policies were the carrot. The stick was anti-socialist laws.
4. In France, during the late 19 th century, only minor laws regarding public assistance to the
indigent were enacted. In 1898 insurance for miners was enacted, as well  as a law regarding
accidents in the workplace. Only in 1928-30 was a social insurance enacted, funded partly by
employers and partly by employees. Family assistance was developed in 1932, spurred by the
effects of the Great Depression.
5. Since 1967 it was about 70% (depending on the type of care and health product), the remaining
part being covered by private insurances that are not mandatory and can be paid as out-of-
pocket expenses. For example, in 2010, 9.4% of all medical expenses (care and medical material)
were  paid  as  out-of-pocket  expenses  and  3.6%  of  expenses  were  optional  insurances,  not
including the expenses for mutuelles, the private, non-mandatory additional health insurances.
6. Both  Roosevelt  and  Johnson  benefited  from  a  window  of  opportunity,  meaning  that  the
political and economic context was in their favor. FDR used the Great Depression and the plight
of millions of  homeless and jobless people to create the basis  of  the Welfare State.  Kennedy
benefited from quite an opposite context: the affluence of the 1950s and 1960s in the post-World
War II economic boom created a context of increased willingness to share resources. However, it
was Johnson who managed to use this window of opportunity.
7. Agrarian interests, however, opposed social policies. This constitutes a parallel with the US,
where the more agrarian South opposed Medicaid expansion.
8. In France, health care was initially promoted as a system based on unity, universalism, and
uniformity, as recommended by the British Beveridge report of 1942. The British National Health
Service enacted these principles. The French sécurité sociale, however, ended up being based more
on the continuity of existing legislation with a scattered system of public and private insurance
and many different “régimes” depending on the professions. Thus the French health insurance
system replicates the stratification of society (Elbaum 41, 43).
9. At the beginning of health insurance in Germany, there were 17,511 insurance companies.
Indeed,  each profession in  each state  had a  specific  insurance  company with automatic  and
compulsory affiliation.
10. Feagin especially develops the idea that racialized class relations (and hence divisions) are a
well-established American political  tradition,  dating back to the beginning of  the colonies to
establish elite privileges. Subsequently the racialized class division has been used (and still is
today) as an efficient means to hamper the development of social  policies and redistributive
measures, thus maintaining elite privileges for a small number of white males. 
11. This  dividing  rhetoric  is  enhanced  by  “H.J.RES.324”  (1987)  which  is  a  central  tool  in
hampering the development of social policies. This act requires that every new reform must be
balanced and not increase the deficit. Reagan largely used this as a strategy for cutting social
programs. Reagan dramatically increased military spending and thus the deficit.  Later on, he
argued that social policies were causing the deficit and moved to cut spending. Moreover, he
presented social policies as a zero-sum game where white middle class families would pay taxes
to finance useless social programs for undeserving minorities who lived an immoral and lazy life.
This  strategy is  best  explained by Edsall  and Edsall  (1991).  The phenomenon of  the Reagan-
Democrats  is  also  explained  by  Françoise  Coste  (2010).  The  role  played  by  values  in  this
phenomenon is analyzed by Brewer and Stonecash (2007).
12. A  separatist  movement  had  started  in  1963  in  the  province  of  Quebec  which  resented
everything that resembled Canadian nation-building. Federal health care was seen as a threat to
the independence of the provinces.
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13. Today the situation is slightly different. The most notable exception is Washington D.C. with
216% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL) for the eligibility for Medicaid benefits. In Alabama it was as
low as 13% FPL, for parents in 2014 (childless adults are not eligible). FPL in 2014 was $11,670
(Medicaid.gov 2016).
14. Especially California and New York expanded their programs. New York had included their
blue-collar  citizens,  thus  covering  up  to  40%  of  the  population  by  Medicaid.  New  federal
regulations limited eligibility to 133% FPL in all states by 1970.
15. Block grants were introduced by president George H. W. Bush in 1990, leading to further cuts
in benefits and eligibility.
16. The other Republican dream come true under the Clinton administration was the reform of
Aid  for  Families  with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC)  that  was  transformed  into  the  way  more
conservative Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) through the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. AFDC was a means-tested program, but there was no lifetime
limit. With TANF, beneficiaries are entitled to only 5 years of assistance over their whole life. In
France, in 2014, the Allocations Familiales, a universal program of cash benefits for children has
become means tested. The benefits are regressive depending on income. See Bekmezian (2014).
The interesting comparative point is that the program cut was made by a leftist government, just
as  the  AFDC reform was  made  by  the  Democratic  Clinton government,  although the  French
reform is less harsh by far than the American reform. However, the ideological approach of the
two reforms were widely different. The French reform aimed the wealthiest families, whereas the
American reform touched low-income single mothers.
17. George W. Bush saw himself as Reagan’s political heir.
18. For example, the Medicare coverage of hospital stays in 2016 included the following financial
participation: a $1,288 deductible for each hospital stay benefit period (minimum of 2 days). The
first 60 days of hospitalization in a benefit period are without coinsurance. Days 60 to 90 of the
benefit period require a coinsurance of $322 per day for each benefit period. Days 91 and beyond
are called “lifetime reserve days” and a patient can benefit of a maximum of 60 over a lifetime.
Otherwise patients have to cover all cost. Each of the lifetime reserve days requires a coinsurance
of $644. To begin a new benefit period, the patient must have been out of hospital for at least 60
days.
19. It has been shown that conservative states have considerably lower welfare benefits than
liberal states. Moreover, states with high minority populations tend to have lower benefits. The
same trend has been observed for TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) benefits.
20. The beneficiaries of Medicaid are the poor elderly, the disabled below 75% FPL, pregnant
women and children under age 6 up to 133% FPL. Medicaid also includes children under age 18
with  eligibility  up  to  100%  FPL.  Poor  able-bodied  adults  have  been  added,  but  this  remains
optional. Parents/caretakers of low-income families qualify since 1996 if their income is below
41% FPL. Before the TANF reform, all persons on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
reformed into TANF) were automatically eligible for Medicaid.  Moreover,  states can chose to
provide Medicaid benefits for the medically needy. CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program)
provides additional coverage for children until age 18 (20 in some cases). Initially it was president
Carter’s welfare reform in 1977 that achieved a better enforcement of the coverage of children
and the addition of pregnant women. The next expansion of children’s coverage was in 1997 with
the creation of SCHIP, later called CHIP.
21. However, it must be specified that the American public opinion does not seem to be quite
sure of what ‘welfare’ actually means. When a question uses the term ‘welfare’ or if an issue is
framed as being ‘welfare’, then people strongly oppose it. However, when asked about specific
measures,  such  as  support  for  mothers  or  medical  help,  or  even  just  help  for  the  needy,
Americans become very charitable and supportive. It must be added, however, that their support
is generally much stronger for programs that promote self-reliance or aim at future self-reliance
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such  as  job-training  or  education  programs.  Their  support  is  weaker  for  in-kind  programs
(medical care and public housing, for example), and is weakest for cash-assistance or assimilated,
such as food stamps.
22. Gilens stressed the fact that mothers with children are perceived as deserving. However, this
must be nuanced because one of the programs that suffered the strongest cuts was AFDC. It was
reformed into TANF by the Clinton administration in 1996, ending its entitlement status and
making it a time-limited program (Fine and Weiss xiii, 3-4).
23. Space does not allow here for a detailed discussion of the racialized discourse and rhetoric
around social policies.
24. The economic status can be determined through many different ways, not only income. In
2009, the white-to-black wealth ratio was 19, the white-to-Hispanic ration was 15. The median
net worth of households in 2009 was $113,149 for whites, $6,325 for Hispanics, and $5,677 for
blacks. See Taylor et al. (2011). In 2010, the Federal Poverty Level was at $10,830 for one person.
4.5% of the total population, 3.3% of the white population, and 10.3% of the black population
were living in poverty (“Selected Economic Trends”).
25. The space does not allow for a detailed explanation of the origins of these racial inequalities.
Suffice it  to say that these inequalities are caused by past and present racial  discrimination,
which is why it is necessary to compensate for structural inequalities with redistributive policies.
26. In 2009, many people lacked health insurance: 16.1% of the total population, 11.5% of the
white population, 20.3% of the black population, and 31.6% of the Hispanic population (De Navas-
Walt et al. 26). Moreover, there are marked differences in the morbidity rates. In 2007, the death
rates of all causes were: total population 760.2 (per 100,000), whites 749.4, blacks 958, Hispanics
546.1.  Regarding  some  specific  pathologies,  the  differences  are  striking.  The  differences  for
diabetes mellitus were: total population 22.5,  whites 20.5,  blacks 42.8,  Hispanics 28.9.  For HIV/
AIDS: total population 3.7, whites 1.9, blacks 17.3, Hispanics 4.1 (CDC 137-9). Regarding HIV/AIDS,
not only are the morbidity rates frightening,  but so is  the number of people living with the
disease: in 2014 blacks represent 44% of the people living with HIV/AIDS (but they represent only
12% of the total population) (CDC 2014b).
27. Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro (1995) make a detailed demonstration of the greater
fragility of  the black middle class compared to the white middle class.  See also Taylor et  al.
(2013); Dalton Conley (2010). For a detailed analysis of the specificities of the black middle class,
especially regarding social interaction, see Karyn R. Lacy (2007).
28. The  doughnut  hole  has  not  yet  been  eliminated.  Currently  (2016)  it  is  between  $3,310
prescription drug fees before catastrophic coverage kicks in at $4,850.  In the doughnut hole,
people have to pay 45% out-of-pocket for brand drugs and 42% for generic drugs. However, 95%
of  the  costs  are  counted  as  out-of-pocket  contributions  to  allow  to  reach  the  catastrophic
coverage faster. Persons with incomes up to 148% FPL (plus some $13,640 in savings) can apply
for extra help (Medicare.gov). The gap is to be closed by 2020, although a 25% rate always applies.
Before the ACA the gap was from $2,800 to $4,550 with a 100% out of pocket.
29. For more details on the loss of public opinion support during the Clinton reform attempt, see
Jacobs and Shapiro (2000).
30. AHIP  (America’s  Health  Insurance  Plans),  AMA  (American  Medical  Association),  PhRMA
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America), AHA (American Hospital Association),
the Chamber of Commerce.
31. ‘Big government’ is an embedded notion, a code word. It encloses a whole rhetorical and
ideological  construct,  but  only  a  brief  explanation  will  be  given here.  It  builds  on  the  idea,
promoted by conservatives/Republicans, that social policies are a way for the Democratic Party/
liberals to cater to undeserving minorities, who prefer to live in idleness and moral decrepitude.
The argument goes  that  these  social  policies  are  financed through taxes  on deserving hard-
working whites. This rhetoric clearly builds on Barry Goldwater’s famous 1964 acceptance speech
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at the Republican National Convention but has most markedly been promoted by Ronald Reagan.
The use of code in racially-divisive discourse is best demonstrated by Tali Mendelberg (2001),
Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall (1991:12, 19, 71, 138); Terry Brimes (2003: 66). Moreover,
‘Big government’  challenges the legitimacy of  federal  state  intervention and advocates  more
state responsibilities. Especially in Reagan’s ideology, government should be nearly non-existent
at a federal level, save for the military. Everything else should be handled by the states. See Hugh
Heclo (27-9).
32. Health Care for American Now! is a progressive activist group gathering a number of smaller
progressive  groups  such  as  American  Friends  Service  Committee (Quakers),  MoveOn,  Planned
Parenthood, True Majority, USAction, and others.
33. Public option was the idea that states would have the possibility to offer a government-run
health care insurance that would have competed with private insurances.
34. Most  famously  among  them:  Max  Baucus  himself,  Ben  Nelson  (Nebraska),  and  Blanche
Lincoln  (Arkansas).  The  Democrats  had  only  a  very  narrow  60-seat  majority  (including  2
independents)  in  the  Senate  allowing  them to  override  a  Republican  filibuster.  This  narrow
majority  gave  conservative  Democrats  in  the  Senate  disproportionate  power  since  every
Democratic voice was dearly needed. Moreover, the death of Senator Kennedy during that period
made  them  lose  the  majority.  Although  the  public  option  was  defeated,  a  crippled  leftover
survived.  The  ACA  allows  state  to  provide  government  health  care  plans  for  low-income
Americans  not  eligible  for  Medicaid:  ACA.  Section  1,  Title  1,  Subtitle  D  “Available  Coverage
Choices  for  All  Americans”  PART  IV—STATE  FLEXIBILITY  TO  ESTABLISH  ALTERNATIVE
PROGRAMS  Sec.  1331.  State  flexibility  to  establish  basic  health  programs  for  low-income
individuals not eligible for Medicaid. 
35. The health exchanges are websites that allow people to compare offers and find the best offer
for their insurance needs.
36. Bart Stupak, Democratic representative from Michigan, was the driving anti-abortion force in
the House. He managed to mobilize enough conservative Democrats to seriously jeopardize the
reform. He had the support of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops that favored universal
coverage,  but  opposed  the  health  reform  because  of  abortion.  Pro-choice  Congressional
Democrats, despite their threat not to support the bill, in the end chose the overall well-being of
women instead on insisting on abortion coverage.
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Title II, Subtitle A, sec. 2001.
38. As of 2016, 19 states (23 in 2014) had not yet adopted the Medicaid extension (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2016c). The legislatures of these states are all under Republican control, except for
Maine (split control) (“State and Legislative Partisan Composition” 2016).
39. Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Kansas,  Maine,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming.
40. These calculations are based on “Population Estimates” (Census 2015).
41. Unfortunately the Census income brackets do not allow for a very close analysis as the second
lowest  income  bracket  comprises  incomes  from  $15,000  to  $24,999,  thus  including  a  small
proportion of persons who would qualify for the Medicaid extension at 133% FPL. In 2015 the FPL
was $11,770. Incomes up to 133% FPL are therefore $15,654, thus including a very small share of
incomes in  the  second lowest  income bracket.  However,  because  the  excess  over  the  lowest
income bracket was so small, less than $1,000, it was preferable not to include the second-lowest
income bracket.
42. It must be pointed out that the eligibility levels for the classical Medicaid in these states vary
tremendously. The lowest eligibility levels for parents and caretakers in 2016 was the level in
Alabama at 13% FPL.
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43. Despite the prohibition for undocumented immigrants to purchase coverage through the
health exchanges, the ACA supports clinics that provide free care for illegal immigrants. It is
supposed that mainly illegal immigrants use the Medicaid emergency programs. A study of the
population using Medicaid emergency in North Carolina between 2001 and 2004 found that 99%
of the users of Medicaid emergency were illegal immigrants (DuBard and Massing 1085-92). Legal
immigrants, however, are covered and subsidized through the ACA. But legal immigrants with
less than 5 years of residence in the US are not eligible for Medicaid.
44. The Cadillac Tax or Excise Tax would have applied to plans that cost more than $10,200 for
individuals and $27,500 for families. The plans exceeding this threshold would have been taxed at
40%. This was also a means to rein in some previous tax exclusion where the most expensive
plans provided for the highest-income employees obtained the highest subsidies through tax
exclusion. Such privileges contribute to the hidden costs of the health system.
45. Unions denounce the employer mandate, for example. According to them it leads employers
to shift their workers on part-time contracts, because only full-time employees must be covered
under the employer mandate. Unions denounce the double loss of income and health benefits.
Another aspect that is denounced concerns the increase of premiums because of expanded health
coverage,  such as  no annual  or  lifetime limits,  coverage of  children up to age 26,  and more
benefits in the plans.
46. It must be added that a better argument was made to defend the Frontier Amendment.
47. The case is slightly different for Republicans. The 2003 Medicare reform is a good example.
The expenditures were not covered, but the bill was passed nonetheless. The 2003 Act added, at
the time of  the enactment,  an estimated $395 billion in  spending (the Congressional  Budget
Office readjusted this estimation to $534 billion in 2004), for the changes made through Medicare
advantage and Part D (drug coverage). The reform was unfunded (meaning the taxpayer had to
pick up the bill)  and contained no cost-containment  for  drugs  because  this  was  contrary to
conservative ideology. Especially the subsidies for Medicare Advantage, Medicare plans managed
by private insurers, have been called “corporate welfare.” Arguments about costs seem to apply
only to Democrats, not to Republicans (Bartlett; Oliver et al.; Kaiser Family Foundation 2016a).
48. CBO.gov:  the Congressional Budget Office is  a non-partisan commission charged with the
financial examination of bills. CBO approval of a bill is paramount in assuring its survival and
enactment.
49. Martin Gilens explains this perception of the poor as being racial minorities. Especially since
the 1960s, the media have increasingly represented poverty with a black face. The proportion of
reports on poverty illustrated with black faces exceeds the proportion of blacks among the poor. 
50. In 2010, about 29.2% of whites and 40.5% of blacks were eligible for those subsidies (Census
2012).
51. For more details on the white backlash against social policies and the subsequent political
exploitation of this backlash by Ronald Reagan in particular, see Edsall and Edsall (1991).
52. Some classical references to racial minorities exist in the ACA, most of which consists in
applying existing rules and regulations to the ACA provisions. For example, in making awards for
the enhancement of health care and workforce training, among the listed priorities are common
affirmative action-type clauses in choosing the benefitting institutions, such as Sec. 5312: “have a
record of training individuals who are from underrepresented minority groups or from a rural or
disadvantaged background;“ Title V, subpart D Sec. 5312.
53. Title X Strengthening Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans. Part III Indian Health
Care Improvement, Subtitle C, Sec.10334 Minority Health. Although this section is buried in the
part  devoted  to  Native  American  health,  the  Office  for  Minority  Health  monitors  all  racial
minorities.
54. The backlash against race-specific policies started in the late 1970s and is still lively today, as
is exemplified by the recent affirmative action ban in Michigan (2014).
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55. France has a law favoring women (Loi sur la parité) compelling political parties to present as
many women as men for elections. The results are less than convincing. Boéton explains that
racial  targeting  is  taboo  in  France,  however,  although  some  measures  are  comparable  to
affirmative action. She cites programs like ZEPs (Zones d’Education Prioritaire, a program adopted
in 1981) that are chosen according to a local  deficit  in cultural,  social,  and economic capital
among  the  population.  Schools  in  such  areas  are  entitled  to  additional  funding  and  extra
teachers, for example. Basically, the state targets the problems, since it is not allowed to target a
racial or ethnic population. Similar programs exist in business and urban areas since 1986. The
UK adopted the Equality  Act  in  2010 and preferred to  call  it  ‘positive  action’.  While  the act
encompasses  minorities,  government  insists  on  the  need  to  combat  the  effects  of  sexism.
Government  also  highlights  the  fact  that  the  act  promotes  more  equality  for  homosexuals.
Moreover,  it  allows,  but  does  not  require,  enterprises  to  take  positive  action  (positive
discrimination and quotas remain prohibited). See “Equality Act” (2010).
56. Anderson argues that the economic inequalities are still so deep between the black and white
populations  that  race-specific,  affirmative  action  type  policies  are  still  justified.  However,
William Julius Wilson argues that  this  applies only to a certain extent.  In 1978,  he famously
argued that affirmative action was not efficient enough, especially to address the needs of the so-
called  “underclass.”  He  favors  race-neutral,  but  issue-focused  policies.  However,  in  2010  he
started to plead for the maintaining of affirmative action, which he deems necessary to secure
the black middle-class (Wilson 2012).
57. See for example Cornel West (1993, 2009). Both advocate this strategy for reasons of political
feasibility.
58. Wilson makes a detailed argument of this in The Declining Significance of Race (2012). After this
pioneering work, others have picked up the same argument, Obama among them.
59. In 2010 20.8% of blacks had no health insurance, compared with 11.7% of whites and 30.7% of
Hispanics.
60. France,  for  example,  refuses  to  establish  racial  statistics  arguing  that  it  would  be
discriminatory. This point is certainly debatable, for it makes it impossible to assess the extent of
inequalities and the effect of discrimination.
61. Obama discusses problems and grievances of the black and Hispanic population in a whole
chapter in The Audacity of Hope. His account of his experience as a community organizer in this
autobiography  shows  that  he  has  a  great  awareness  of  the  problems  faced  by  the  black
population.
62. See any of the reports produced by the US Census Bureau or any other administration, such
as the reports cited above.  Among the first  government-ordered reports  were the Moynihan
Report (1965) and the Kerner Report (1968), both describing the seriousness of the situation. The
US Department for Health and Human Services coordinates several health agencies. Among the
major agencies are: The National Institutes of Health, The Center for Disease Control, and The
Office  for  Minority  Health.  The  latter  pays  especially  attention  to  racial  disparities,  but  all
establish statistics by race and ethnicity. 
63. In 2010, 49.7% of the black population was in the two lowest income quintiles (up to $35,000)
compared with 31.5% of  the white  population belonging to  the two lowest  quintiles  (Census
2012).
64. The Medicaid extension to up to 133% FPL (if all states applied it) could benefit 17.2% of the
black  population  (as  compared  with  5.9%  of  the  white  population.)  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,
2006-2010 American Community Survey).
65. However, the inadequacy of the funds is also denounced. See Gordon Schiff and Claudia Fegan
(2003: 307–11).
66. The overall death rate for blacks in 2010 was 958 per 100,000, as compared with 760.2 per
thousand  for  the  total  population,  763.3  per  100,000  for  whites,  and  546.1  per  100,000  for
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Hispanics.  For  many  selected  causes  of  death  black  rates  are  much  higher  than  for  other
populations. For example: (in per 100,000) for diseases of the heart,  the black rate was 247.3
compared with 191.4 for whites or 136 for Hispanics. For malignant neoplasms it was 215.5 for
blacks, compared with 182.3 for whites and 116.2 for Hispanics. Other stark differences concern
diabetes  mellitus.  The  black  death  rate  was  42.8,  compared  with  19.8  for  whites  and 28.9  for
Hispanics.  The  contrast  is  even  more  frightening  for  HIV.  The  black  death  rate  was  17.3
compared with 1.5 for whites and 4.1 for Hispanics. 
67. CDC. Division of HIV Prevention. 29 Apr. 2015. Consulted 12 Feb. 2016. CDC. “Diabetes Public
Health  Resource,”  Center  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention.  5  Sept.  2014.  In  2012  blacks
represented  41%  of  the  HIV  infected  population  but  they  only  represent  12%  of  the  total
population, compared with whites making up 34% of the HIV population but representing 63% of
the total population. The diabetes rate for black males was 9.7% in 2010, 9.3% for black females,
compared with 6.6% for white males and 5.4% for white females.
68. The rates in 2012 were 51.5 per 1000 for blacks and 23.5 per 1000 for whites. Blacks and
Hispanics together accounted for 57% of all teen pregnancies in 2012.
69. In 2009 the rates for blacks were 12.4 per 1,000 live births, compared to a rate of 6.6 for the
total population and 5.5 for whites. Among the OECD countries, the US had the highest infant
mortality rate in 2010 with 6.1 compared to the lowest rate of 2.3 for Finland, or 3.4 for Germany
and 3.6 for France (MacDorman et al. 1).
ABSTRACTS
This article examines the particularities of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
in a historical comparative perspective. Comparisons are made to highlight the specificities of
the  American  welfare  state  and  of  health  legislation  in  particular.  The  comparisons  with
European countries aim at highlighting the particularity of racial division among the American
working and middle class that hampered the expansion of the American welfare state and how
this impacted the ACA. Despite certain shortcomings resulting of the idiosyncrasies of America’s
welfare  state  and  political  system  (the  single  payer  system  was  not  considered,  Medicaid
expansion is now optional, a market-based system), the ACA nonetheless managed to circumvent
some problems due to the racialization of social policies and found ways to address some of the
needs of minority populations by targeting specific issues that are particularly problematic for
those populations.
Cet article analyse les particularités du Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act de 2010 (ACA)
dans une perspective comparatiste et historique. Les comparaisons servent à mettre en lumière
les spécificités de l’Etat providence états-unien et en particulier de la législation en matière de
santé. Les comparaisons servent à mettre en évidence la particularité de la division raciale parmi
la classe ouvrière et la classe moyenne qui a freiné le développement de l’Etat providence aux
Etats-Unis  et  comment  cela  s’est  répercuté  sur  l’ACA.  Malgré  certains  défauts  résultant  de
l’idiosyncrasie de l’Etat-providence et du système politique états-unien, tels que l’abandon du
single payer system à la canadienne ou encore le fait que l’extension de Medicaid soit devenue
optionnelle,  ou  un  système  de  santé  fondé  sur  le  marché,  le  ACA  a  réussi  tout  de  même  à
contourner certains problèmes causés par la racialisation des politiques sociales et à répondre à
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certains  besoins  des  populations  minoritaires  en  ciblant  des  problèmes  spécifiques  affectant
principalement ces populations.
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